During the Cold War, Turkey’s official foreign security threat whitepaper nicely covered all of its neighbors plus the entire non-neighboring Warsaw Pact, its satellite states around the globe plus some Arab countries. There were plenty of enemies, from next door to almost the next planet. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the list was radically narrowed to half the world.
About a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the enemy list was further narrowed to “every state that may be supporting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK,” plus Greece, Cyprus and “every state that may be supporting either of the Hellenic nations.” A parallel list detailing “domestic threats” quickly replaced former foes that were no longer on the list. Suddenly, there were plenty of enemies again, from inside homeland to next door.
Enemy lists often reflect a blend of rational thinking, caution and paranoia, although in Turkey’s case the latter may have occupied a space larger than necessary. But fortunately, the collective feeling of being surrounded by enemies is fading. The Turks are ready to embrace their old nemesis Greece, old foes Russia, Arab nations, Iran and, perhaps less willingly, their archenemy Armenia. This is the new security threat concept: an enemy-less enemy list. In about two decades, Turkey has transformed from perceiving two thirds of the world as a “threat” to practically perceiving none.
Elected governments have every legitimate right to make foreign policy, revise it, decide which foreign nation to view as friend or foe, revise it, and shape spending in line with these foreign policy and security deliberations and priorities. The Justice and Development Party, or AKP, is no exception. It has every right to declare half the world or only Martians as foes. It has every right to declare the entire galaxy as friends. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s famous “zero-problems-with-neighbors” doctrine can be criticized (or even ridiculed at times), but its legitimacy cannot be questioned.
Further fortifying this doctrine, Mr. Davutoğlu recently said Turkey does not perceive any missile (or other military) threat from any of its neighbors, although he was referring indirectly to Iran. Press reports have suggested that this thinking would soon be echoed in Turkey’s threat whitepaper, officially known as the National Security Policy Document. Former usual suspects Russia, Greece, Syria, Iran and (northern) Iraq will no longer be on the list, according to these reports.
All that has a consistent line of logic: 1- There is an elected government, 2- Its foreign policy is based on zero problems with the country’s neighbors, and, therefore, 3- Its foreign security threat document does not include any of its neighbors (or even non-neighbors). The missing link is between all that consistent line of logic and defense spending.
Defense spending must be coherent with an established security concept. If Turkey’s security policy predicted an armed conflict with Argentina, its sanity could have been questioned, but, acquisition of aircraft carriers based on this security policy would have been rational. But spending billions of dollars on weapons systems targeting threats that, according to the security concept, do not exist is ridiculous.
For instance, Turkey may soon have to spend a generous $5 billion to buy modest air-defense systems to protect its soil from enemy missile and aircraft attack. Since the proposed system can provide “shielding” against short- to medium-range (non-ballistic) missiles – which must therefore come from some neighboring territory – and since Turkey does not perceive any security threat from its neighbors why is it going to spend a fortune on these systems?
Why did the government spend $500 million only to develop four prototypes of what will eventually be Turkey’s “first national tank,” the Altay? What do armies do with tanks? Either invade neighboring lands or fight invading armies from neighboring lands. Since none of those scenarios is part of Turkey’s national defense strategy, why will Ankara eventually spend up to $10 billion on hundreds of third-generation main battle tanks?
Why does Turkey spend billions of dollars on naval systems, including new frigates, corvettes, submarines, coastal surveillance systems and even a “landing platform dock that can carry up to eight helicopters?” Which country in our seas of peace poses a security threat to Turkey? None, according to the threat paper. What, then, justifies the generous naval spending?
“Deterrence” cannot be the explanation. Deterrence can be applicable to situations in which the country that aims to be “deterrent” suspects the other(s) of aggressive intentions. Since Turkey has no enemies in its vicinity (well, according to the government at least…) what will it do with new generation tanks and air defense systems and frigates and a landing platform dock? Which government would spend tens of billions of dollars on equipment it thinks it will not need?
There is something bizarre here. Either the government is privately skeptical about its own threat perceptions, or it just wants to buy expensive war toys for fun!
About a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the enemy list was further narrowed to “every state that may be supporting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK,” plus Greece, Cyprus and “every state that may be supporting either of the Hellenic nations.” A parallel list detailing “domestic threats” quickly replaced former foes that were no longer on the list. Suddenly, there were plenty of enemies again, from inside homeland to next door.
Enemy lists often reflect a blend of rational thinking, caution and paranoia, although in Turkey’s case the latter may have occupied a space larger than necessary. But fortunately, the collective feeling of being surrounded by enemies is fading. The Turks are ready to embrace their old nemesis Greece, old foes Russia, Arab nations, Iran and, perhaps less willingly, their archenemy Armenia. This is the new security threat concept: an enemy-less enemy list. In about two decades, Turkey has transformed from perceiving two thirds of the world as a “threat” to practically perceiving none.
Elected governments have every legitimate right to make foreign policy, revise it, decide which foreign nation to view as friend or foe, revise it, and shape spending in line with these foreign policy and security deliberations and priorities. The Justice and Development Party, or AKP, is no exception. It has every right to declare half the world or only Martians as foes. It has every right to declare the entire galaxy as friends. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s famous “zero-problems-with-neighbors” doctrine can be criticized (or even ridiculed at times), but its legitimacy cannot be questioned.
Further fortifying this doctrine, Mr. Davutoğlu recently said Turkey does not perceive any missile (or other military) threat from any of its neighbors, although he was referring indirectly to Iran. Press reports have suggested that this thinking would soon be echoed in Turkey’s threat whitepaper, officially known as the National Security Policy Document. Former usual suspects Russia, Greece, Syria, Iran and (northern) Iraq will no longer be on the list, according to these reports.
All that has a consistent line of logic: 1- There is an elected government, 2- Its foreign policy is based on zero problems with the country’s neighbors, and, therefore, 3- Its foreign security threat document does not include any of its neighbors (or even non-neighbors). The missing link is between all that consistent line of logic and defense spending.
Defense spending must be coherent with an established security concept. If Turkey’s security policy predicted an armed conflict with Argentina, its sanity could have been questioned, but, acquisition of aircraft carriers based on this security policy would have been rational. But spending billions of dollars on weapons systems targeting threats that, according to the security concept, do not exist is ridiculous.
For instance, Turkey may soon have to spend a generous $5 billion to buy modest air-defense systems to protect its soil from enemy missile and aircraft attack. Since the proposed system can provide “shielding” against short- to medium-range (non-ballistic) missiles – which must therefore come from some neighboring territory – and since Turkey does not perceive any security threat from its neighbors why is it going to spend a fortune on these systems?
Why did the government spend $500 million only to develop four prototypes of what will eventually be Turkey’s “first national tank,” the Altay? What do armies do with tanks? Either invade neighboring lands or fight invading armies from neighboring lands. Since none of those scenarios is part of Turkey’s national defense strategy, why will Ankara eventually spend up to $10 billion on hundreds of third-generation main battle tanks?
Why does Turkey spend billions of dollars on naval systems, including new frigates, corvettes, submarines, coastal surveillance systems and even a “landing platform dock that can carry up to eight helicopters?” Which country in our seas of peace poses a security threat to Turkey? None, according to the threat paper. What, then, justifies the generous naval spending?
“Deterrence” cannot be the explanation. Deterrence can be applicable to situations in which the country that aims to be “deterrent” suspects the other(s) of aggressive intentions. Since Turkey has no enemies in its vicinity (well, according to the government at least…) what will it do with new generation tanks and air defense systems and frigates and a landing platform dock? Which government would spend tens of billions of dollars on equipment it thinks it will not need?
There is something bizarre here. Either the government is privately skeptical about its own threat perceptions, or it just wants to buy expensive war toys for fun!
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| Guest - ILKER/CYPRUS 2010-10-27 16:18:12 |  |
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| Guest - David 2010-10-27 16:08:06 | |
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