Της ΚΥΡΑΣ ΑΔΑΜ
Η κυβέρνηση του κ. Ερντογάν παίζει την Αθήνα μονότερμα. Τη μια αφήνει ασχολίαστο τουρκικό δημοσίευμα, σύμφωνα με το οποίο στις αρχές του χρόνου στο Ερζερούμ, στην ετήσια σύνοδο των Τούρκων πρέσβεων, θα πάρει μέρος (!) ο Ελληνας πρωθυπουργός. Οι δύο πρωθυπουργοί θα ανακοινώσουν «σχέδιο ειρήνης για το Αιγαίο», σχετικά με την υφαλοκρηπίδα και τα άλλα προβλήματα.
Από τη Νέα Υόρκη ο υπουργός Εξωτερικών της Τουρκίας κ. Νταβούτογλου έσπευσε προχθές να δηλώσει ότι ήδη «κάνουνε μπίζνες στο Αιγαίο» χωρίς περαιτέρω διευκρινίσεις.
Ολα αυτά το λιγότερο που υποδηλούν είναι ότι Αθήνα και Αγκυρα χρησιμοποιούν το Αιγαίο η κάθε μια για την εξυπηρέτηση της πολιτικής της.
Η μείωση της έντασης και η ειρήνη στο Αιγαίο αποτελεί πάγια ελληνική επιδίωξη, με την προϋπόθεση ότι δεν θα παραχωρηθούν κυριαρχικά και οικονομικά ελληνικά δικαιώματα και συμφέροντα.
Παραχώρηση
Ομως, το οποιοδήποτε σχέδιο ή συμφωνία ειρήνης για το Αιγαίο (αν δεν επέλθει προηγούμενη τουρκική αλλαγή πολιτικής) συνεπάγεται εξ ορισμού παραχώρηση, διότι όλα τα συναφή θέματα, από την υφαλοκρηπίδα, την ΑΟΖ, τη ζώνη αλιείας, τον εναέριο χώρο, την περιοχή έρευνας και διάσωσης κ.λπ. έχουν ως βάση και εξαρτώνται από το εύρος των χωρικών υδάτων. Το εύρος των χωρικών υδάτων δεν έχει ακόμα οριοθετηθεί, ενώ παραμένει ενεργό το casus belli για την επέκταση των ελληνικών χωρικών υδάτων μέχρι τα 12 ν.μ.
Και όμως, πίσω από αυτή «τη ρουτίνα» στην αντιμετώπιση του θέματος κρύβονται σημαντικές αλλαγές της τουρκικής πολιτικής που σημειώθηκαν στο παρελθόν και τις οποίες δεν εκμεταλλεύθηκε ποτέ η Αθήνα.
Νόμος του '64
Η Τουρκία το 1964 ψήφισε το νόμο 746/15-5-64 για το εύρος των χωρικών υδάτων στο Αιγαίο.
Με το νόμο αυτό η Τουρκία αποδεχόταν:
* Την αρχή της μέσης γραμμής, εκεί όπου υπήρχε επικάλυψη ελληνικής και τουρκικής χωρικής θάλασσας (όπως είναι στις ανατολικές ακτές των νήσων Λέσβου, Σάμου, Χίου, Ικαρίας, Καστελόριζου κ.λπ.) και δεν είχε επέλθει προηγουμένως συμφωνία. Η ενέργεια αυτή ήταν λογική και είχε ως βάση τη διεθνή νομιμότητα.
* Την αρχή της αμοιβαιότητας, δηλαδή αν η Ελλάδα επέκτεινε τα χωρικά ύδατά της στα 10 ν.μ. ή 12 ν.μ. το ίδιο θα μπορούσε να κάνει και η Τουρκία, καθώς επίσης και το αντίστροφο.
Η Αθήνα δεν εκμεταλλεύθηκε ποτέ τις διατάξεις του τουρκικού νόμου, θεωρώντας τον προφανώς ως «σίγουρο».
Η τουρκική πολιτική άλλαξε το 1982, με στόχο το σφετερισμό των ελληνικών κυριαρχικών και οικονομικών δικαιωμάτων στο Αιγαίο. Ετσι η Τουρκία (από κοινού με τις ΗΠΑ, το Ισραήλ και τη Βενεζουέλα) όχι μόνον καταψήφισε το Δίκαιο της Θάλασσας του 1982, αλλά βρήκε την ευκαιρία να αλλάξει και το νόμο για τον καθορισμό του εύρους των χωρικών υδάτων, ψηφίζοντας το νόμο 2674/1982.
Ισχύων νόμος
Με τον ισχύοντα νόμο:
* Καταργείται η αρχή της αμοιβαιότητας και ορίζεται ότι για την οριοθέτηση των χωρικών υδάτων θα λαμβάνονται υπόψη όλες οι ιδιομορφίες στη θάλασσα, καθώς και η αρχή της επιείκειας. Αυτό αναφέρεται σαφώς στα ελληνικά νησιά στο Αν. Αιγαίο. Προκειμένου ακόμα να αιτιολογήσει τις επεκτατικές βλέψεις της κατά της Ελλάδας και να επιβάλει τις θέσεις του τουρκικού νόμου, η Αγκυρα ισχυρίζεται ότι τα ελληνικά νησιά αποτελούν συνέχεια της ηπειρωτικής Τουρκίας.
* Καταργείται η μέση γραμμή τόσο για τα χωρικά ύδατα όσο και για τα θαλάσσια σύνορα και αυτά θα καθορίζονται με την αρχή της επιείκειας και τις ιδιομορφίες της περιοχής. Για παράδειγμα, στην περιοχή της Σάμου, της Χίου, του Καστελόριζου κ.λπ., όπου η απόσταση με την Τουρκία είναι 3 ν.μ., τα χωρικά ύδατα και τα θαλάσσια σύνορα δεν θα είναι 1,5 ν.μ. (μέση γραμμή), αλλά η περιοχή θα ανήκει σύμφωνα με τον τουρκικό νόμο στην Τουρκία, διότι εκεί υπάρχουν ιδιομορφίες, αφού η Τουρκία ισχυρίζεται ότι τα νησιά αυτά αποτελούν προέκταση και συνέχεια της ηπειρωτικής Τουρκίας...
Σύμφωνα με το νόμο, το υπουργικό συμβούλιο της Τουρκίας είναι αυτό που θα καθορίζει τις γραμμές βάσης, δηλαδή την περιοχή από την οποία μετρώνται (αρχίζουν) τα χωρικά ύδατα. Ετσι στην περιοχή του κόλπου της Σμύρνης, στα Στενά κ.λπ., η Τουρκία μπορεί να ορίσει γραμμή βάσης 60 ν.μ. και τα τουρκικά χωρικά ύδατα να φτάσουν μέχρι... τη Θάσο.
Οι ελληνικές κυβερνήσεις γνωρίζουν πολύ καλά το θέμα από το 1982, όταν εκφράστηκαν εγγράφως και επισήμως οι σφοδρές ανησυχίες για τον τουρκικό νόμο και ετέθησαν και υπόψη τού τότε πρωθυπουργού, χωρίς όμως να υπάρξει συνέχεια.
Είναι ενδεικτικό το απόρρητο έγγραφο του τότε Α/ΓΕΑ Ν. Κουρή προς τον πρωθυπουργό Α. Παπανδρέου, αλλά και το τηλεγράφημα της ίδιας περιόδου από την πρεσβεία της Αγκυρας που γνωστοποιεί τον τουρκικό νόμο. * http://www.enet.gr
Geopolitical Research Institute(GRI)/Εταιρεία Γεωπολιτικών Ερευνών(ΕΓΕ)
Σάββατο 18 Δεκεμβρίου 2010
Ανταγωνιστικοί αγωγοί φυσικού αερίου
Της ΝΕΦΕΛΗΣ ΤΖΑΝΕΤΑΚΟΥ
Εναλλακτικούς «δρόμους» για την προμήθεια φυσικού αερίου, ώστε να καλύψει τις διαρκώς αυξανόμενες ενεργειακές της ανάγκες αναζητά η Ευρώπη, η οποία, παράλληλα, επιδιώκει μακροπρόθεσμα να αποδεσμευτεί από τους ενεργειακούς πόρους της Ρωσίας.
Ωστόσο, το κόστος κατασκευής και λειτουργίας των αγωγών αυτών είναι ιδιαίτερα υψηλό, με συνέπεια να εκφράζονται φόβοι ότι το φυσικό αέριο θα καταλήγει ακριβό στον Ευρωπαίο καταναλωτή.
Την ίδια στιγμή όμως το μέλλον των αγωγών απειλείται αφ' ενός από την έμφαση που δίνεται στο υγροποιημένο φυσικό αέριο (LNG -το υγροποιημένο φυσικό αέριο είναι φυσικό αέριο που έχει μετατραπεί προσωρινά σε υγρή μορφή για τη διευκόλυνση της αποθήκευσης ή της μεταφοράς του με πλοία), αφ' ετέρου από τη νέα ενεργειακή τεχνολογία που έχουν αναπτύξει η ΗΠΑ και η Κίνα, για την παραγωγή φυσικού αερίου από σχιστολιθικό άργιλο.
Πάντως, στο πεδίο του ανταγωνισμού για τους εναλλακτικούς δρόμους του φυσικού αερίου διαγκωνίζονται έξι αγωγοί για το ποιος θα αξιοποιήσει τον νότιο διάδρομο ή τον «νέο δρόμο του μεταξιού», προμηθεύοντας τις χώρες της Κεντρικής Ευρώπης με φυσικό αέριο από την Κασπία και τη Μέση Ανατολή.
Οι πιο γνωστοί από τους αγωγούς είναι ο Nabucco αλλά και ο, «ανταγωνιστικός» προς αυτόν, ρωσικός South Stream.
Οι αγωγοί ΤΑΡ, ITGI και AGRI, αν και λιγότερο φιλόδοξα σχέδια, έχουν τη «δύναμη» να τους «απειλήσουν».
Ενας μικρότερος αγωγός, ο White Stream -πρωτοβουλία της Ουκρανίας- θα μπορούσε επίσης να αποτελέσει ικανό αντίπαλο, καθώς στοχεύει στη μεταφορά φυσικού αερίου από τον Καύκασο, μέσω της Γεωργίας και της Ουκρανίας, στη Ρουμανία.
Η πολιτική διάσταση
Η ρωσο-ουκρανική διαμάχη το 2006 και στη συνέχεια το 2009 λειτούργησε υπέρ της αναβίωσης του ενδιαφέροντος για τους αγωγούς North Stream και South Stream, αν και η Ευρώπη αναγνωρίζει τους κινδύνους από την εξάρτησή της από τη Ρωσία. Η Μόσχα, από την πλευρά της, θέτει σε εφαρμογή το δικό της πρόγραμμα για τη διαφοροποίηση των οδών μεταφοράς του ρωσικού φυσικού αερίου, ανακοινώνοντας ότι οι ποσότητες φυσικού αερίου για τον αγωγό South Stream είναι εγγυημένες.
Η επιλογή των χωρών κατά τη χάραξη των αγωγών δεν είναι διόλου τυχαία.
Η παράκαμψη της Ουκρανίας, στην περίπτωση του αγωγού South Stream αποτελεί πολιτική επιλογή της Ρωσίας, όπως και του αγωγού AGRI, ο οποίος παρακάμπτει την Τουρκία και την Ουκρανία.
Ολοι οι υπό κατασκευήν αγωγοί σε κάποιο σημείο συναντούν και ενσωματώνονται στο ήδη υπάρχον δίκτυο. Σε αρκετές περιπτώσεις, μάλιστα, οι διαδρομές συμπίπτουν απόλυτα.
Το στοιχείο το οποίο ουσιαστικά διαφοροποιεί τον κάθε αγωγό είναι η πηγή τροφοδοσίας του.
Οι χώρες, οι οποίες θα αναλάβουν την τροφοδοσία των αγωγών αυτών, είναι εκείνες που «κρατούν» στα χέρια τους και την «τύχη» του καθενός.
Πηγές
Η Ευρώπη φαίνεται να προτιμά το Αζερμπαϊτζάν, το Τουρκμενιστάν και το Ιράκ. Στην πράξη, όμως, όλοι οι ευρωπαϊκοί αγωγοί που θα αποτελέσουν τον νότιο διάδρομο θα στηρίζονται στο Αζερμπαϊτζάν, τουλάχιστον στην αρχή.
Τι θα συμβεί όμως εάν το Μπακού αποφασίσει να πουλήσει τα αποθέματά του σε φυσικό αέριο στη Ρωσία;
Σύμφωνα με τον πρόεδρο της Gazprom, Αλεξέι Μίλερ, μόνο τρεις χώρες θα είναι σε θέση στο μέλλον να εξασφαλίσουν τις ποσότητες που θα χρειάζεται η Ευρώπη: η Ρωσία, το Ιράν και το Κατάρ.
Σύμφωνα με τη μελέτη της αμερικανικής Energy Information Administration (International Energy Outlook 2010) τα μεγαλύτερα αποθέματα φυσικού αερίου τα διαθέτει η Ρωσία (το 25,4% των παγκόσμιων αποθεμάτων, ήτοι 1,680 τρισ. κ.μ.), το Ιράν (15,8%, ήτοι 1,046 τρισ. κ.μ.), το Κατάρ (13,6%, ήτοι 899 τρισ. κ.μ.), το Τουρκμενιστάν (4%, ήτοι 265 τρισ. κ.μ.) και η Σαουδική Αραβία (4%, ήτοι 265 τρισ. κ.μ.).
Το Αζερμπαϊτζάν δεν συμπεριλαμβάνεται στις 20 πρώτες χώρες με τα μεγαλύτερα αποθέματα φυσικού αερίου.
Στο μέλλον, ωστόσο, η παραγωγή αναμένεται να αυξηθεί, λόγω του κοιτάσματος Shah Deniz, το οποίο, σύμφωνα με αναλυτές, είναι ένα από τα μεγαλύτερα κοιτάσματα φυσικού αερίου στον κόσμο. Σύμφωνα με μελέτη της ΒΡ, το κοίτασμα μπορεί να αποδώσει έως και 15 τρισ. κ.μ. φυσικού αερίου το χρόνο. * http://www.enet.gr
Εναλλακτικούς «δρόμους» για την προμήθεια φυσικού αερίου, ώστε να καλύψει τις διαρκώς αυξανόμενες ενεργειακές της ανάγκες αναζητά η Ευρώπη, η οποία, παράλληλα, επιδιώκει μακροπρόθεσμα να αποδεσμευτεί από τους ενεργειακούς πόρους της Ρωσίας.
Ωστόσο, το κόστος κατασκευής και λειτουργίας των αγωγών αυτών είναι ιδιαίτερα υψηλό, με συνέπεια να εκφράζονται φόβοι ότι το φυσικό αέριο θα καταλήγει ακριβό στον Ευρωπαίο καταναλωτή.
Την ίδια στιγμή όμως το μέλλον των αγωγών απειλείται αφ' ενός από την έμφαση που δίνεται στο υγροποιημένο φυσικό αέριο (LNG -το υγροποιημένο φυσικό αέριο είναι φυσικό αέριο που έχει μετατραπεί προσωρινά σε υγρή μορφή για τη διευκόλυνση της αποθήκευσης ή της μεταφοράς του με πλοία), αφ' ετέρου από τη νέα ενεργειακή τεχνολογία που έχουν αναπτύξει η ΗΠΑ και η Κίνα, για την παραγωγή φυσικού αερίου από σχιστολιθικό άργιλο.
Πάντως, στο πεδίο του ανταγωνισμού για τους εναλλακτικούς δρόμους του φυσικού αερίου διαγκωνίζονται έξι αγωγοί για το ποιος θα αξιοποιήσει τον νότιο διάδρομο ή τον «νέο δρόμο του μεταξιού», προμηθεύοντας τις χώρες της Κεντρικής Ευρώπης με φυσικό αέριο από την Κασπία και τη Μέση Ανατολή.
Οι πιο γνωστοί από τους αγωγούς είναι ο Nabucco αλλά και ο, «ανταγωνιστικός» προς αυτόν, ρωσικός South Stream.
Οι αγωγοί ΤΑΡ, ITGI και AGRI, αν και λιγότερο φιλόδοξα σχέδια, έχουν τη «δύναμη» να τους «απειλήσουν».
Ενας μικρότερος αγωγός, ο White Stream -πρωτοβουλία της Ουκρανίας- θα μπορούσε επίσης να αποτελέσει ικανό αντίπαλο, καθώς στοχεύει στη μεταφορά φυσικού αερίου από τον Καύκασο, μέσω της Γεωργίας και της Ουκρανίας, στη Ρουμανία.
Η πολιτική διάσταση
Η ρωσο-ουκρανική διαμάχη το 2006 και στη συνέχεια το 2009 λειτούργησε υπέρ της αναβίωσης του ενδιαφέροντος για τους αγωγούς North Stream και South Stream, αν και η Ευρώπη αναγνωρίζει τους κινδύνους από την εξάρτησή της από τη Ρωσία. Η Μόσχα, από την πλευρά της, θέτει σε εφαρμογή το δικό της πρόγραμμα για τη διαφοροποίηση των οδών μεταφοράς του ρωσικού φυσικού αερίου, ανακοινώνοντας ότι οι ποσότητες φυσικού αερίου για τον αγωγό South Stream είναι εγγυημένες.
Η επιλογή των χωρών κατά τη χάραξη των αγωγών δεν είναι διόλου τυχαία.
Η παράκαμψη της Ουκρανίας, στην περίπτωση του αγωγού South Stream αποτελεί πολιτική επιλογή της Ρωσίας, όπως και του αγωγού AGRI, ο οποίος παρακάμπτει την Τουρκία και την Ουκρανία.
Ολοι οι υπό κατασκευήν αγωγοί σε κάποιο σημείο συναντούν και ενσωματώνονται στο ήδη υπάρχον δίκτυο. Σε αρκετές περιπτώσεις, μάλιστα, οι διαδρομές συμπίπτουν απόλυτα.
Το στοιχείο το οποίο ουσιαστικά διαφοροποιεί τον κάθε αγωγό είναι η πηγή τροφοδοσίας του.
Οι χώρες, οι οποίες θα αναλάβουν την τροφοδοσία των αγωγών αυτών, είναι εκείνες που «κρατούν» στα χέρια τους και την «τύχη» του καθενός.
Πηγές
Η Ευρώπη φαίνεται να προτιμά το Αζερμπαϊτζάν, το Τουρκμενιστάν και το Ιράκ. Στην πράξη, όμως, όλοι οι ευρωπαϊκοί αγωγοί που θα αποτελέσουν τον νότιο διάδρομο θα στηρίζονται στο Αζερμπαϊτζάν, τουλάχιστον στην αρχή.
Τι θα συμβεί όμως εάν το Μπακού αποφασίσει να πουλήσει τα αποθέματά του σε φυσικό αέριο στη Ρωσία;
Σύμφωνα με τον πρόεδρο της Gazprom, Αλεξέι Μίλερ, μόνο τρεις χώρες θα είναι σε θέση στο μέλλον να εξασφαλίσουν τις ποσότητες που θα χρειάζεται η Ευρώπη: η Ρωσία, το Ιράν και το Κατάρ.
Σύμφωνα με τη μελέτη της αμερικανικής Energy Information Administration (International Energy Outlook 2010) τα μεγαλύτερα αποθέματα φυσικού αερίου τα διαθέτει η Ρωσία (το 25,4% των παγκόσμιων αποθεμάτων, ήτοι 1,680 τρισ. κ.μ.), το Ιράν (15,8%, ήτοι 1,046 τρισ. κ.μ.), το Κατάρ (13,6%, ήτοι 899 τρισ. κ.μ.), το Τουρκμενιστάν (4%, ήτοι 265 τρισ. κ.μ.) και η Σαουδική Αραβία (4%, ήτοι 265 τρισ. κ.μ.).
Το Αζερμπαϊτζάν δεν συμπεριλαμβάνεται στις 20 πρώτες χώρες με τα μεγαλύτερα αποθέματα φυσικού αερίου.
Στο μέλλον, ωστόσο, η παραγωγή αναμένεται να αυξηθεί, λόγω του κοιτάσματος Shah Deniz, το οποίο, σύμφωνα με αναλυτές, είναι ένα από τα μεγαλύτερα κοιτάσματα φυσικού αερίου στον κόσμο. Σύμφωνα με μελέτη της ΒΡ, το κοίτασμα μπορεί να αποδώσει έως και 15 τρισ. κ.μ. φυσικού αερίου το χρόνο. * http://www.enet.gr
Diplomacy: Putting out the fire?
Photo by: Creative Commons Diplomacy: Putting out the fire?
By GALLIA LINDENSTRAUSS
12/18/2010 08:58
Both Israel and Turkey apparently want to improve ties, but the new signs of goodwill may not be enough to heal a breach. Israel viewed Turkey’s dispatch of fire-fighting planes to help put out the enormous forest fire on Mount Carmel very positively. It brought about the first significant breakthrough toward mending the broken relations since flotilla affair this past May. The forced takeover of the Turkish Mavi Marmara led to a freeze in relations that were already tense, partly the result of Turkey’s response to Operation Cast Lead. The positive dynamics created by Turkish aid reflect a certain desire on the part of both states to resolve the crisis, though it is uncertain if this is enough to clear the hurdles on the way to a significant improvement of relations.
It seems that since the flotilla episode, Turkey and Israel have been engaged in a zero sum game. Turkey has demanded an apology and compensation for the victims of the Marmara’s forced takeover; Israel has refused, claiming that the flotilla was a planned, violent provocation and that no other army in the world would act differently under similar circumstances. Israeli public opinion has overwhelmingly opposed an apology, which is seen as surrendering to the Turks.
However, from the Turkish perspective, if the Turks accepted Israel’s expressions of regret made immediately after the flotilla, it would seem as if Turkey were conceding its repeated public demands for an apology and compensation. To these conditions is the additional demand for a full removal of the blockade on the Gaza Strip, and steps to ease the blockade have apparently not been deemed sufficient.
The fact that Israel and Turkey have come to the point of being caught in a zero sum game is in stark contradiction to the principles currently guiding Turkey’s foreign policy. According to the “zero problems” approach initiated by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey must make serious efforts to resolve the problems it has with its neighbors and even strive for maximum cooperation with them.
This policy has led to closer relations with Syria and Iran, as well as attempts to mend relations with Armenia.
The irony, of course, is that there were barely any problems with Israel, but that the zero problems policy is precisely one of the elements that generated the worst crisis in the history of their relations. The closer ties between Turkey and Iran and Turkey and Syria, as well as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s harsh statements about Israeli policy, have led to the assessment that Turkey is prepared to sacrifice its relations with Israel to improve its relations with its other neighbors.
While Erdogan has become highly popular among Palestinians and in overall Arab public opinion as the result of his image as a staunch opponent to Israel, there have also been costs to the policy. First and foremost, it has bolstered the claim that unlike in the Cold War era when Turkey was firmly Western, today it is looking eastward. Erdogan’s harsh anti-Israel statements have strengthened suspicions against Turkey both in the US and the European Union. Moreover, Turkey, which aspires to increase its influence in the Middle East and continue to serve as a mediator in a number of regional conflicts, cannot afford to be in a position in which it has no direct positive channels of communication with Israel.
FROM ISRAEL’S perspective and despite its dissatisfaction with some of Turkey’s actions, escalation makes it more difficult to cope with its existential threats, especially those coming from Iran. When Turkey, while trying to mediate between Iran and the West about the nuclear issue, protested what it deemed Western hypocrisy in demanding a nuclear-free Iran without addressing Israel’s nuclear weapons, this made the struggle over world public opinion on Iran all the more difficult.
The fact that Iran is using Turkey to overcome some of the damage inflicted by the international sanctions against it undercuts the effectiveness of the sanctions to obstruct the Iranian nuclear effort. Moreover, Israel will not benefit from an attempt to push Turkey further into a situation where it is identified with the radical axis in the Middle East.
Some in Israel are hoping for a change in government following Turkey’s parliamentary elections, apparently scheduled for June, and therefore they worry that a concession regarding the flotilla would be understood as a victory for Erdogan. In actuality, his political standing is firm even without scoring points on the Israeli issue.
To a certain extent, both Turkey and Israel are interested in improving relations, but the fact that Turkish citizens were killed by IDF fire is something that will greatly affect any future relations. The issue of the apology and compensation, also complex from a legal point of view, may be partially resolved at the government level, but will continue to figure prominently in the media and public opinion in both countries.
In addition, the implications of such an apology and compensation exceed Israel- Turkey relations. Those who oppose a thaw in relations will continue the zero sum game discourse and present the concessions made by their side as obsequiousness. Should a thaw in relations occur, both countries will have to make a serious effort to stress their common interests, such as the fact that, in principle, they are partners in the war against terrorism.
Even if a solution is found soon for the flotilla-related crisis, it will be a long time before relations are fully mended. It is doubtful that Turkey will want to renew security relations, and it is equally doubtful that Israel will want to cooperate on security issues in light of Turkey’s growing closeness with Syria, Iran and Hamas.
More time will have to pass before Israeli tourists feel comfortable vacationing in Turkey again. In terms of economic relations, a significant part of the dealings between Israeli and Turkish companies has continued undeterred by the political crisis.
Presumably, however, there could be a change in relations at the level of academic and civil society cooperation, which were damaged by the crisis.
The writer is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies.
By GALLIA LINDENSTRAUSS
12/18/2010 08:58
Both Israel and Turkey apparently want to improve ties, but the new signs of goodwill may not be enough to heal a breach. Israel viewed Turkey’s dispatch of fire-fighting planes to help put out the enormous forest fire on Mount Carmel very positively. It brought about the first significant breakthrough toward mending the broken relations since flotilla affair this past May. The forced takeover of the Turkish Mavi Marmara led to a freeze in relations that were already tense, partly the result of Turkey’s response to Operation Cast Lead. The positive dynamics created by Turkish aid reflect a certain desire on the part of both states to resolve the crisis, though it is uncertain if this is enough to clear the hurdles on the way to a significant improvement of relations.
It seems that since the flotilla episode, Turkey and Israel have been engaged in a zero sum game. Turkey has demanded an apology and compensation for the victims of the Marmara’s forced takeover; Israel has refused, claiming that the flotilla was a planned, violent provocation and that no other army in the world would act differently under similar circumstances. Israeli public opinion has overwhelmingly opposed an apology, which is seen as surrendering to the Turks.
However, from the Turkish perspective, if the Turks accepted Israel’s expressions of regret made immediately after the flotilla, it would seem as if Turkey were conceding its repeated public demands for an apology and compensation. To these conditions is the additional demand for a full removal of the blockade on the Gaza Strip, and steps to ease the blockade have apparently not been deemed sufficient.
The fact that Israel and Turkey have come to the point of being caught in a zero sum game is in stark contradiction to the principles currently guiding Turkey’s foreign policy. According to the “zero problems” approach initiated by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey must make serious efforts to resolve the problems it has with its neighbors and even strive for maximum cooperation with them.
This policy has led to closer relations with Syria and Iran, as well as attempts to mend relations with Armenia.
The irony, of course, is that there were barely any problems with Israel, but that the zero problems policy is precisely one of the elements that generated the worst crisis in the history of their relations. The closer ties between Turkey and Iran and Turkey and Syria, as well as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s harsh statements about Israeli policy, have led to the assessment that Turkey is prepared to sacrifice its relations with Israel to improve its relations with its other neighbors.
While Erdogan has become highly popular among Palestinians and in overall Arab public opinion as the result of his image as a staunch opponent to Israel, there have also been costs to the policy. First and foremost, it has bolstered the claim that unlike in the Cold War era when Turkey was firmly Western, today it is looking eastward. Erdogan’s harsh anti-Israel statements have strengthened suspicions against Turkey both in the US and the European Union. Moreover, Turkey, which aspires to increase its influence in the Middle East and continue to serve as a mediator in a number of regional conflicts, cannot afford to be in a position in which it has no direct positive channels of communication with Israel.
FROM ISRAEL’S perspective and despite its dissatisfaction with some of Turkey’s actions, escalation makes it more difficult to cope with its existential threats, especially those coming from Iran. When Turkey, while trying to mediate between Iran and the West about the nuclear issue, protested what it deemed Western hypocrisy in demanding a nuclear-free Iran without addressing Israel’s nuclear weapons, this made the struggle over world public opinion on Iran all the more difficult.
The fact that Iran is using Turkey to overcome some of the damage inflicted by the international sanctions against it undercuts the effectiveness of the sanctions to obstruct the Iranian nuclear effort. Moreover, Israel will not benefit from an attempt to push Turkey further into a situation where it is identified with the radical axis in the Middle East.
Some in Israel are hoping for a change in government following Turkey’s parliamentary elections, apparently scheduled for June, and therefore they worry that a concession regarding the flotilla would be understood as a victory for Erdogan. In actuality, his political standing is firm even without scoring points on the Israeli issue.
To a certain extent, both Turkey and Israel are interested in improving relations, but the fact that Turkish citizens were killed by IDF fire is something that will greatly affect any future relations. The issue of the apology and compensation, also complex from a legal point of view, may be partially resolved at the government level, but will continue to figure prominently in the media and public opinion in both countries.
In addition, the implications of such an apology and compensation exceed Israel- Turkey relations. Those who oppose a thaw in relations will continue the zero sum game discourse and present the concessions made by their side as obsequiousness. Should a thaw in relations occur, both countries will have to make a serious effort to stress their common interests, such as the fact that, in principle, they are partners in the war against terrorism.
Even if a solution is found soon for the flotilla-related crisis, it will be a long time before relations are fully mended. It is doubtful that Turkey will want to renew security relations, and it is equally doubtful that Israel will want to cooperate on security issues in light of Turkey’s growing closeness with Syria, Iran and Hamas.
More time will have to pass before Israeli tourists feel comfortable vacationing in Turkey again. In terms of economic relations, a significant part of the dealings between Israeli and Turkish companies has continued undeterred by the political crisis.
Presumably, however, there could be a change in relations at the level of academic and civil society cooperation, which were damaged by the crisis.
The writer is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies.
Energy and Infrastructure Forecast for Turkey in 2011
Haluk Direskeneli
Energy analyst
In this op-ed, I aim to make forecast in our local energy markets in the New Year 2011. As you know, economy and business are governed by expectations. Market expectations are important in the economic forecasts as well as investments. At this time, there are many economic forecasts made by the newspaper columnists however as we all see there are almost none in energy markets. So within my capacity, I tried to outline a draft forecast albeit maybe somewhat irrational/ unfair for the New Year. Here are my predictions and expectations for the New Year 2011;
1. As year ends, experienced senior GMs of public enterprises will be promoted to upper consultancy posts, and then transferred to upper posts of private enterprise boards. New arrivals to those vacated posts will consume the remaining time rest of the year to get education necessary for the new posts they got; hence they will not take any initiative.
2. World Bank and IMF delegations will have more visits to our Energy Ministry, Energy Regulatory Board, State Planning Organization, and Business Associations. Smiling faces will appear in the local media.
3. Ministry of Energy will be looking for new projects to follow without considering that any initiative in energy sector gets its response in 10 year time in future. We all know that there is no fast solution.
4. Newspaper columnists will continue to write ridiculous articles on energy business and continue to make confusions in Volt/Watt, MWe/ MegaByte.
5. Electrical Energy Market Law Nr. 4628 will be changed again. Some Clauses will be deleted. Some new Clauses will be inserted before general elections in July 2011.
6. Akkuyu Nuclear Power plant contract which was a sort of I did it my way scheme is signed with the Russians between government to government agreements. Ground breaking ceremony at site will be held soon.
7. Location search for new nuclear power plants will be moved from hot waters of Mediterranean to Black Sea coast. New options will emerge in Igneada and Hopa since their local reactions would be expected less.
8. Nuclear technology education in Hacettepe and Istanbul Technical University will lead the national curriculum with their new MSc and PhD programs. METU will stay behind and continue to say "This subject is not on our agenda".
9. Local investors have initiated to build new thermal power plants (2x(2x660) MWe) in Amasra firing "indigenous coal" where we all know that there is no sufficient amount of local coal to run the power plants in the long term. They will soon try to switch to imported coal option. People and NGOs of Amasra reacted to thermal power plants in 2010. Amasra CED is cancelled. Project is later moved to Filyos valley which is 25 km towards west.
10. Natural Gas bill will be completed. Pipeline public company will extend a portion of the contract. Termination of the public natural gas monopoly and market dominance is long-term wishful thinking.
11. Black Sea offshore drilling is initiated. At least once every month, we shall read "Large quantities of Gas/Petrol found, sufficient for local consumption" in the news media.
12. Those who know and those who do not know, those who are capable and not capable, will all apply to get investment license to construct new imported coal firing thermal power plants on the shores of Iskenderun Bay. Public will react to such excessive crowd with unconventional opposition methods. Unconventional egg throwing will be nasty, sad but common reaction nowadays.
13. People and NGOs of Iskenderun, Payas, Dortyol counties will stand up for serious environmental concerns on new excessive number of imported coal firing thermal power plants. Other than environmental concerns, local people will feel that they have all the legal rights to block through local courts since there will be neither participation of local employment nor any local engineering in the new investments.
14. In early 2011, Iran will again cut-off the Natural Gas flow again due to excessive needs of her own domestic market for at least 1-month. Russians will increase capacity in the Blue Stream for a premium as usual.
15. HEPP investments and dam construction actives will be increased on the small beautiful creeks on the highlands of Eastern Black Sea coast. Our high tempered Black Sea coast citizens will not be so pleased with the outcome.
16. Our local NGO Do not touch my Creek will have rise in public appearance with unconventional opposition/ reaction procedures.
17. Local TV programs will be increased over the Ilisu Dam. All these programs will have Tigris pasture image in the background accompanied with the sheep and pathetic background music. Everyone will memorize these photographs of sheep and the ruins.
18. Afsin Elbistan A power plant Units 3-4 rehabilitation will be tendered. There will be not sufficient participation and in the end it will be cancelled again. Tender for new Afsin Elbistan C-E units will be released. Due to excessive financial risks not bankable, participation will be limited and the tender will be cancelled again because of high prices.
19. Rapid privatization could be realized. Soma/ CAN/ Hamidabad/ SeyitOmer local lignite/ coal fired thermal power plants will be sold / privatized.
20. Ladies of Straw Mountain will react to wind power plants in their Samandag region. No one will listen to them. EIA report will not be needed. There will be no land, slope, hill left without wind towers.
21. Wind power plant investments in Cesme Peninsula will continue till the end of this year. Energy Transmission problems will be of high concern.
22. Local production of Wind power plants will continue. JV news will increase, for the smallest power generation not less than 3 MW, Prototypes will be displayed with public inaugurations.
23. Yenikoy / Kangal TPP rehabilitations will be completed. Foreign OEM companies, who got contracts without competitive tendering, will have good earnings compared to the work that they spent. "Black Coal / Black Energy" court investigations/ prosecutions may start.
24. Antalya 1150 MWe CCPP is in operation. Feasibilities for additional 2600 MWe will be initiated. Since the plant cooling system will consume huge amount of drinking water, there will be extreme water shortage in the region in summer time. Investment expansion is foreseen to triple the capacity. People of the province will understand the seriousness of the situation soon.
25. New 900 MW CCPP is completed in Bandirma. Preliminary design works for the new gas fired 1000 MWe additional capacity second plant is initiated. Bandirma will have domestic / foreign investor invasion for TPP, CPP, RES, HES, GES investments, and agricultural land will be narrowed.
26. Local companies that sell their capital equity shares to foreigners will face excessive / unnecessary expenditures in foreign engineering/ foreign equipment. Foreign partners will purchase only from their own home countries with expensive OEM costs. Ultimately, because of excessive unnecessary costs, locals will feel the need reconsideration of the contracts with their JV foreign partners.
27. The set up for new thermal power plants in unexploited local coal regions in auctions will result in a kind of absence. Only Adana Tufanbeyli 450 MWe TPP is contracted. The search for new solutions on this issue will be in the agenda again in the second half of the year.
28. CCPP investments will continue in Samsun province based on Natural gas firing due to Blue Stream. However Energy transmission will have overcapacity difficulties. Since Each and every incentive/ every good intention are abused with extreme care, therefore political power is expected to be reluctant to issue incentives to renewable energy.
29. Solar thermal power plants will appear in inland Anatolia i.e. Konya Plato where agriculture is not so profitable. Local production means will be investigated. In the end, solar panels from China will dominate the local market since they are cheaper than those that manufactured in local industrial zones.
30. De-grading due to excessive wear and tear in Chinese made local thermal power plants will emerge. Early rehabilitation requirements will start. Cheap Chinese companies will get rehab and long-term operation contracts in the local market. Local unemployment will get increased. There will be difficulties in upcoming general election polls.
31. Distribution Privatizations is now almost complete in 2010. Almost all public distribution systems are privatized. Privatization Price is pass-through cost item to retail consumers.
32. Ministry of Environment will approve incoming EIA applications with little worry over local NGO reactions or any scrutiny to the environmental hazards of the new investments due to ever increasing concern over upcoming energy shortage. However upcoming General elections may require policy change.
33. Local energy markets regulatory agency will continue to release licenses to those who know or dont know the technology, those who have financial capability or those who do not have, but to all those who complete the necessary forms.
34. Agency will ask unreasonable number of more new staff due to ever getting work load. Market scrutiny/auditing will be tendered to private / foreign audit companies.
35. Public Agency will start to complain that the new building is too small for ever increasing staff. They will investigate new land purchase in Golbası County to move.
36. Medium age of Board members will be much more reduced in Public Agencies. New university graduates will be assigned as Board members, provided that they have taken top grades in Thermodynamics.
37. Investors will have investment licenses all expired soon. Renewable energy entrepreneurs will not be able to sell their licenses. The negotiation traffic will get increased in the halls of the Agency.
38. Since Ministry of Environment accepts all incoming EIA applications without serious scrutiny, local NGO reactions and court applications/ and unconventional opposition methods will be alarmingly increased.
39. Anyhow upcoming General elections may require all new energy policy changes.
Source : Turkish Weekly
Energy analyst
In this op-ed, I aim to make forecast in our local energy markets in the New Year 2011. As you know, economy and business are governed by expectations. Market expectations are important in the economic forecasts as well as investments. At this time, there are many economic forecasts made by the newspaper columnists however as we all see there are almost none in energy markets. So within my capacity, I tried to outline a draft forecast albeit maybe somewhat irrational/ unfair for the New Year. Here are my predictions and expectations for the New Year 2011;
1. As year ends, experienced senior GMs of public enterprises will be promoted to upper consultancy posts, and then transferred to upper posts of private enterprise boards. New arrivals to those vacated posts will consume the remaining time rest of the year to get education necessary for the new posts they got; hence they will not take any initiative.
2. World Bank and IMF delegations will have more visits to our Energy Ministry, Energy Regulatory Board, State Planning Organization, and Business Associations. Smiling faces will appear in the local media.
3. Ministry of Energy will be looking for new projects to follow without considering that any initiative in energy sector gets its response in 10 year time in future. We all know that there is no fast solution.
4. Newspaper columnists will continue to write ridiculous articles on energy business and continue to make confusions in Volt/Watt, MWe/ MegaByte.
5. Electrical Energy Market Law Nr. 4628 will be changed again. Some Clauses will be deleted. Some new Clauses will be inserted before general elections in July 2011.
6. Akkuyu Nuclear Power plant contract which was a sort of I did it my way scheme is signed with the Russians between government to government agreements. Ground breaking ceremony at site will be held soon.
7. Location search for new nuclear power plants will be moved from hot waters of Mediterranean to Black Sea coast. New options will emerge in Igneada and Hopa since their local reactions would be expected less.
8. Nuclear technology education in Hacettepe and Istanbul Technical University will lead the national curriculum with their new MSc and PhD programs. METU will stay behind and continue to say "This subject is not on our agenda".
9. Local investors have initiated to build new thermal power plants (2x(2x660) MWe) in Amasra firing "indigenous coal" where we all know that there is no sufficient amount of local coal to run the power plants in the long term. They will soon try to switch to imported coal option. People and NGOs of Amasra reacted to thermal power plants in 2010. Amasra CED is cancelled. Project is later moved to Filyos valley which is 25 km towards west.
10. Natural Gas bill will be completed. Pipeline public company will extend a portion of the contract. Termination of the public natural gas monopoly and market dominance is long-term wishful thinking.
11. Black Sea offshore drilling is initiated. At least once every month, we shall read "Large quantities of Gas/Petrol found, sufficient for local consumption" in the news media.
12. Those who know and those who do not know, those who are capable and not capable, will all apply to get investment license to construct new imported coal firing thermal power plants on the shores of Iskenderun Bay. Public will react to such excessive crowd with unconventional opposition methods. Unconventional egg throwing will be nasty, sad but common reaction nowadays.
13. People and NGOs of Iskenderun, Payas, Dortyol counties will stand up for serious environmental concerns on new excessive number of imported coal firing thermal power plants. Other than environmental concerns, local people will feel that they have all the legal rights to block through local courts since there will be neither participation of local employment nor any local engineering in the new investments.
14. In early 2011, Iran will again cut-off the Natural Gas flow again due to excessive needs of her own domestic market for at least 1-month. Russians will increase capacity in the Blue Stream for a premium as usual.
15. HEPP investments and dam construction actives will be increased on the small beautiful creeks on the highlands of Eastern Black Sea coast. Our high tempered Black Sea coast citizens will not be so pleased with the outcome.
16. Our local NGO Do not touch my Creek will have rise in public appearance with unconventional opposition/ reaction procedures.
17. Local TV programs will be increased over the Ilisu Dam. All these programs will have Tigris pasture image in the background accompanied with the sheep and pathetic background music. Everyone will memorize these photographs of sheep and the ruins.
18. Afsin Elbistan A power plant Units 3-4 rehabilitation will be tendered. There will be not sufficient participation and in the end it will be cancelled again. Tender for new Afsin Elbistan C-E units will be released. Due to excessive financial risks not bankable, participation will be limited and the tender will be cancelled again because of high prices.
19. Rapid privatization could be realized. Soma/ CAN/ Hamidabad/ SeyitOmer local lignite/ coal fired thermal power plants will be sold / privatized.
20. Ladies of Straw Mountain will react to wind power plants in their Samandag region. No one will listen to them. EIA report will not be needed. There will be no land, slope, hill left without wind towers.
21. Wind power plant investments in Cesme Peninsula will continue till the end of this year. Energy Transmission problems will be of high concern.
22. Local production of Wind power plants will continue. JV news will increase, for the smallest power generation not less than 3 MW, Prototypes will be displayed with public inaugurations.
23. Yenikoy / Kangal TPP rehabilitations will be completed. Foreign OEM companies, who got contracts without competitive tendering, will have good earnings compared to the work that they spent. "Black Coal / Black Energy" court investigations/ prosecutions may start.
24. Antalya 1150 MWe CCPP is in operation. Feasibilities for additional 2600 MWe will be initiated. Since the plant cooling system will consume huge amount of drinking water, there will be extreme water shortage in the region in summer time. Investment expansion is foreseen to triple the capacity. People of the province will understand the seriousness of the situation soon.
25. New 900 MW CCPP is completed in Bandirma. Preliminary design works for the new gas fired 1000 MWe additional capacity second plant is initiated. Bandirma will have domestic / foreign investor invasion for TPP, CPP, RES, HES, GES investments, and agricultural land will be narrowed.
26. Local companies that sell their capital equity shares to foreigners will face excessive / unnecessary expenditures in foreign engineering/ foreign equipment. Foreign partners will purchase only from their own home countries with expensive OEM costs. Ultimately, because of excessive unnecessary costs, locals will feel the need reconsideration of the contracts with their JV foreign partners.
27. The set up for new thermal power plants in unexploited local coal regions in auctions will result in a kind of absence. Only Adana Tufanbeyli 450 MWe TPP is contracted. The search for new solutions on this issue will be in the agenda again in the second half of the year.
28. CCPP investments will continue in Samsun province based on Natural gas firing due to Blue Stream. However Energy transmission will have overcapacity difficulties. Since Each and every incentive/ every good intention are abused with extreme care, therefore political power is expected to be reluctant to issue incentives to renewable energy.
29. Solar thermal power plants will appear in inland Anatolia i.e. Konya Plato where agriculture is not so profitable. Local production means will be investigated. In the end, solar panels from China will dominate the local market since they are cheaper than those that manufactured in local industrial zones.
30. De-grading due to excessive wear and tear in Chinese made local thermal power plants will emerge. Early rehabilitation requirements will start. Cheap Chinese companies will get rehab and long-term operation contracts in the local market. Local unemployment will get increased. There will be difficulties in upcoming general election polls.
31. Distribution Privatizations is now almost complete in 2010. Almost all public distribution systems are privatized. Privatization Price is pass-through cost item to retail consumers.
32. Ministry of Environment will approve incoming EIA applications with little worry over local NGO reactions or any scrutiny to the environmental hazards of the new investments due to ever increasing concern over upcoming energy shortage. However upcoming General elections may require policy change.
33. Local energy markets regulatory agency will continue to release licenses to those who know or dont know the technology, those who have financial capability or those who do not have, but to all those who complete the necessary forms.
34. Agency will ask unreasonable number of more new staff due to ever getting work load. Market scrutiny/auditing will be tendered to private / foreign audit companies.
35. Public Agency will start to complain that the new building is too small for ever increasing staff. They will investigate new land purchase in Golbası County to move.
36. Medium age of Board members will be much more reduced in Public Agencies. New university graduates will be assigned as Board members, provided that they have taken top grades in Thermodynamics.
37. Investors will have investment licenses all expired soon. Renewable energy entrepreneurs will not be able to sell their licenses. The negotiation traffic will get increased in the halls of the Agency.
38. Since Ministry of Environment accepts all incoming EIA applications without serious scrutiny, local NGO reactions and court applications/ and unconventional opposition methods will be alarmingly increased.
39. Anyhow upcoming General elections may require all new energy policy changes.
Source : Turkish Weekly
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